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This article examines the implications of a postmodern ethics for bioethical problems. 
Traditional approaches to bioethics, with specific reference to “principlism”, depend 
on a modernist strategy which attempts to produce gene ralised solutions. Making 
use of complexity theory, it is shown that the factors specific to each instance cannot 
be reduced in an objective way. The contingency of each individual case has to be 
considered. This leads to an ethics which cannot be the result of following universal 
rules, but one that has to accept the responsibility for the outcome of our decisions, 
even if these outcomes are not fully predictable. The responsibility for our choices 
cannot be shifted onto some a priori principle.
Kompleksiteit, postmodernisme en die bio-etiese dilemma
Hierdie artikel ondersoek die implikasies van ’n post-moderne etiek ten opsigte van 
bio-etiese probleme. Tradisionele bio-etiese bena derings, met spesifieke verwysing 
na beginselmatigheid (principlism), maak staat op moder nistiese strategiëe wat 
veralgemeende oplossings na vore bring. Deur kompleksiteitsteorie aan te wend, 
word aangetoon dat die faktore wat spesifiek is aan elke situasie, nie in ’n objektiewe 
manier gereduseer kan word nie. Die gebeurlikheid van elke individuele geval moet 
oorweeg word. Dit lei tot ’n etiek wat nie tot stand kom deurdat universele reëls 
nagekom word nie, maar wat bereid is om verantwoordelikheid te aanvaar vir die 
besluite wat geneem word, selfs al is die uitkomste van die besluite nie ten volle 
voorspelbaar nie. Die verantwoordelikheid van besluite kan dus nie verskuif word 
na ’n a priori beginsel nie.
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The world in which we live and act is becoming more and more “postmodern”. The media are ubiquitous and our under-standing of others and ourselves is determined by images and 
pieces of information which are virtual products. Traditional mo-
dernist assumptions — that there is a rational solution to all pro-
blems and that we should strive to extract exact truths in most con-
texts — are certainly becoming more difficult to maintain. In this 
paper we want to critically evaluate demands made upon morality by 
acknowledging that we live in a “postmodern society”. We wish to 
examine the impact of “postmodern ethics” on morality in general, 
but on applied bioethics in particular. To provide a cohesive descrip-
tion of postmodern ethics is in many ways an impossible task. In the 
field of biomedical ethics is even more problematic since a postmo-
dern approach will raise questions about the nature, justification and 
practice of bioethics.
Notwithstanding a widespread challenge to the “project of 
modernity”, contemporary bioethics seems to be resigned to an ap-
parently modernistic theoretical framework.1 A myriad of modali-
ties is supposed to assist the medical practitioner’s quest for ethically 
sound action: so-called “ethical rules”, bioethical “specialists”, com-
mittees and other bodies, and divergent ideas and theories of bio medical 
ethics, ranging from utilitarianism (the archetype of consequentialist 
theories) to one based on principles (the archetype of deontological 
theories).2 Both of these extremes are modernistic in the sense of pre-
scribed rules that would guarantee morality. A specific example is 
the version of principlism3 promoted by Beauchamp & Childress 
1 Alistair MacIntyre, in After Virtue (1981), denied that modernity should ever have 
been. The searing attacks of Friedrich Nietzsche are early examples of extreme 
distrust dating back to the latter part of the nineteenth century.
2 We do not imply that all practitioners show an understanding of this; it is the 
essence of our challenge that modernity prevents the realisation and acceptance 
of ethical responsibility in biomedical ethics as in other spheres of life.
3 In this context, principlism may be defined as a theory of ethics which presupposes 
that moral actions may be reduced to compliance to particular principles (or rules). 
In bioethics its origins may be traced to the Belmont Report (of the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, April 18, 1979) <http://ohsr.od nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html>
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(1994). It is by far the most prevalent, quoted and common, as well 
as the most taught, and “practised” contemporary “theory” of bio-
medical ethics. Its four principles have become the cornerstones of 
biomedical ethics in America, in much of the western world and in 
the bioethical literature. This is often presented to the medical prac-
titioner with unquestioned authority and an equally unrealistic tenet: 
honouring these principles guarantees ethically sound action.
It should be clear that there is a tension between this theoretical 
framework and its application in a complex, postmodern world. On 
the one hand, there is a desire for clear ethical guidelines, but, on the 
other, there is the realisation that such guidelines, if they are general 
abstractions, do not address the contingency of specific cases. This 
places the bioethical practitioner in a dilemma. S/he appears to have 
to choose between clear guidelines (which do not really map onto 
reality) and a radical contingency (which provides her/him with no 
way of justifying her/his actions).
In what follows we wish to show that an interpretation of post-
mo dernism, substantiated with arguments from complexity theory, 
can help us to deal with this dilemma. Without dismissing princi-
plism, our view can seriously challenge the scope of principlist ar-
guments. This interpretation will be developed by considering the 
characteristics of a postmodern ethics which does not imply relativism. 
It is exactly in this respect that complexity theory provides such a 
useful framework. This position will then be used to critically evalu-
ate the principlist position. Finally, some conclusions on the impli-
cations for bioethics will be drawn.
1. Complexity, ethics and postmodern society
Contemporary society, whether “terminally modern”, “functional” 
(Van Peursen 1974) or indeed “postmodern” (Lyotard 1984, Bauman 
1993, Cilliers 1998), exhibits certain characteristics or traits.4 There 
4 Our use of the term “society” should be expanded upon. Society consists of many 
and diverse groupings. Though many of these are rather fixed and determined, 
the majority are contextual and potential, in Bauman’s vocabulary, “somewhat 
postulated”, and warrant special consideration when viewed from the perspec-
tive of postmodernity.
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are many diverging characterisations of the forms of know ledge in this 
society, but in general there is a resistance to universal answers and a 
denial of a single overarching metanarrative. The main pro blem with 
the modernist insistence on a single narrative is that it under estimates 
the complexity and the relational nature of the issues at stake (Cilliers 
1998: 112). Human culture is complex (Van Peursen 1974: 12) and 
complexity theory helps us to understand aspects of this complexity 
without recourse to modernist assumptions on the one hand, or a 
regression into relativity on the other (cf Cilliers 2005).
We shall employ analyses of the characteristics of complexity 
with reference to contemporary society and to the notion of the self 
(Cilliers & De Villiers 2000) in order to bridge the gap from com-
plexity to contemporary bioethics. We shall firstly summarise the 
characteristics of complexity theory very briefly.5 We will argue that 
such a description renders the idea of a “single truth” impossible; 
that postmodern ethics evolve from an “agonistic” process involving 
a constantly changing interactivity amongst contingent groupings 
of individuals within society; and that all forms of truth (including 
ethical truth) in society are contextual, provisional and subject to change.
A complex system consists of a great number of dynamically 
interactive units or elements. The level of interaction is compara-
tively rich; the number of meeting-points (nodes) and the amount of 
information exchanged is vast. Moreover, each element influences, 
and is influenced by, an indeterminate number of other elements in 
varying proportion and importance. Single interconnective meeting 
points or nodes are of lesser importance; complex and context-sensitive 
patterns encode information and create meaning.
Most importantly the interactions are non-linear, thus the law 
of super-positioning does not apply. The components of a non-linear 
system cannot simply be added. Minor causes can have major results 
and vice versa. Complexity presupposes non-linearity, without which 
it would be a simple and predictable system; in this respect non-lin-
ear systems cannot be modelled in a deterministic way. Interactions 
5 The characteristics of complex systems are summarised below fairly cryptically. 
For a more detailed discussion, cf Cilliers 1998.
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have a short range; elements are in interaction mainly with their 
immediate neighbours, although effects (exchange of energy/infor-
mation/knowledge) permeate throughout and influence an entire 
system, even as these effects are modulated along the way. There is 
little meta-control or centralised organisation. Self-organisation oc-
curs through the high level of feedback.
Complex systems are open, without clear boundaries, and in-
teract with their environments. Nevertheless, a system is “framed” 
relative to the observer within a functional boundary (Cilliers 2001). 
Equilibrium is not reconcilable with complexity since complexity 
requires constant evolution which in turn relies on a constant flow of 
energy. Equilibrium in this context signifies the “death” of the system.
Complex systems have a history which can be viewed as being 
an evolution over time. The past can be understood as being a col-
lection of footprints spread through and taken up in the system as 
a frame of reference within which the present is viewed. Individual 
elements are not aware of the behaviour of the system as a whole. Due 
to the short range, richness and complexity of interactions, model-
ling a complex system in conventional ways (like using a set of dif-
ferential equations) is not possible.
Contemporary human society exhibits many of these charac-
teristics. It can be understood as a system with individuals and groups 
of individuals as the elements. There is a high level of interaction 
during which information is constantly exchanged between sub-
jects. One cannot conceive of an individual as being in isolation; the 
isolated self has very little meaning. Each element or self is consti-
tuted in a system of differences and is moreover in itself a complex 
heterogeneous system. Each person finds himself fragmented into 
various contextual sub-elements created by the variety of his poten-
tially conflicting contextual interests, resulting in internal uncer-
tainty and conflict. There is a dynamic competition for the attention 
of each agent. This dilemma contributes to the tentativeness, provi-
sional nature and moral uncertainty characteristic of our times.6
6 Roederer (2000: 76-7) sketches the background to the fragmentation of the in-
dividual and society. The growth of corporative capitalism, industrialisation, 
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Subjects are bombarded with information and cannot hold a 
comprehensive view of everything in the moral community. Since 
there is no central authority with undisputed legitimacy, moral cer-
tainty escapes the moral agent. Moral decisions are always provisional 
and subject to circumstance; new answers constantly need to be de-
veloped in constantly changing situations. What is ethical in one 
circumstance may not be ethical in another, since the two contexts 
are not reducible to each other.
This does not curtail the relevance of the moral agent. Rele vance 
is constructed, not found, in terms of kinds of activities the agent 
participates in. We cannot escape the “agonistics” of the moral society 
or network (Cilliers 1998: 138). Only through participation in the 
process of society can we play any meaningful ethical role. The non-
linearity of cause and effect relations applies in particular to human 
society. Unpredictability, self-organisation, dynamic adjustment and 
evolution are constitutive of society and thus also of the generation of 
ethical positions. Morality is understood as provisional, temporary 
and subject to correction. This makes postmodern ethics contentious 
by nature, but does not necessarily imply moral relativism, as we 
shall argue below.
Much of how we think about ourselves and the world is contingent 
on our spatial and temporal location (Cilliers & De Villiers 2000: 239), 
thus our personal history and professional knowledge is always perti-
nent. Since our understanding of ourselves and our place in the world 
is not static, there is also a constant evolution of our ethical position as 
society, personal history and professional know ledge changes, again em-
phasising the provisional, contingent and contextual nature of ethics. 
bureaucratisation, and the increasing role of science in society fragments the indi-
vidual and eventually denudes him of integrity and humanity. Factories render the 
human an appendage of the machine, burocratisation turns the official into an un-
thinking technocrat, and corporative capitalism finally cancels all hope the ordinary 
person may yet have to be the master of his own destiny. Science strips the world of 
spirituality and magic, whilst contemporary man is pulled and pushed hither and 
thither. The result is something akin to Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty character. 
The question further raised by Roederer is whether Humpty can be restored to being 
a good egg (Dewey’s project of reintegration) or not (Max Weber’s position).
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The postmodern assumption of morality as the necessary con-
sequence of a continuous, dynamic and complex interactive partici-
pation in society, the borders of which are vague, indefinable and 
tentative, or contextual (“postulated” writes Bauman 1993: 46), 
conflicts with the possibility of ethics as the construct of a purely 
rational process. Ethics, and thus also applied ethics, should be an 
extension of the ethical process in and of society, the process where-
by society is constituted.7 There is no abstract or universal method 
available which circumvents the necessity of being involved in the 
process itself, to partake of the “agonistics of the network”. 
2. Critiques of postmodern ethics
We have now outlined the general considerations which should in-
form a postmodern ethics. This position will now be given some 
more substance, albeit it in a somewhat oblique way. From a mo-
dernist perspective, of which principlism is an example, there are a 
number of criticisms directed at the postmodern position. We shall 
take them one by one and, by reflecting on each critically, the central 
characteristics of a postmodern ethics will emerge.
2.1 The postmodern ethical position is fundamentally 
unethical
It is argued that in the absence of objective and rational considerations 
no ethics is possible. This challenge is based upon a misunderstand-
ing of the fundamental position of postmodernity concerning con-
flicting definitions of morality (Cilliers 1998: 136-40). Postmoder-
nity does not argue against ethics per se, but maintains that morality 
is not reconcilable with a priori meta-descriptions leading to objecti-
vity and consensus. A morality based on rules, laws, prescriptions 
and consensus is, from the postmodern perspective, no ethics at all 
since it reduces the whole ethical process to calculation. A strategy 
7 As displayed in civil society movements and activist organisations such as 
Greenpeace, clustering in pro-life and pro-choice groupings, surrounding AIDS 
issues, and in the euthanasia debate.
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depending on consensus leads to the removal of conflicting consid-
erations and thus to a reduction of the complexity of the situation.
Postmodernists advocate the proliferation of heterogeneous dis-
course and dissent as necessary in the process of opening up the com-
plexity of the specific problem under consideration. Eventually com-
promise, as opposed to consensus, is required. Such a “compromise” 
may bracket some of the conflicting considerations for the time be-
ing, but keeps the multiple interpretations of what is at stake open. 
It limits the scope of the problem to the contextual here-and-now 
of a decision, instead of postulating the current understanding as a 
permanent solution. Morality is the result of an evolutionary process 
which should result in social transformation.
2.2 The postmodern ethical position is insensitive to 
the question of justice
The postmodern argument suggests that a universal notion of justice 
is unattainable. Under complex conditions no single judgement will 
do justice to the many, often contradictory, demands being made by 
all involved. This does not mean that justice is not an extremely seri-
ous consideration. In a sense, we can only start reflecting on the no-
tion once we have acknowledged how difficult it is (Cilliers 2004).
The postmodern position argues that justice is not obtained by 
finding objective criteria which will be just, but that justice presup-
poses responsibility. Participants should realise the heteromorphy 
of language games, and that all instances of consensus on the rules 
of any discourse are local, legitimised by local players and therefore 
subject to revision (Lyotard 1984). The type of responsible evalua-
tion required from the moral agent, we argue, should include at least 
the following:
•	Respect	for	difference	of	values	in	themselves;
•	Gathering	as	much	information	as	possible	(not	all	information	 
 is accessible);
•	Evaluation	of	the	consequences	of	a	decision	(not	all	consequences	 
 can be envisioned);
•	Guaranteed	revision	of	a	decision,	immediately	revising	its	faults,	 
 both specific and general, once they become apparent.
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These tenets are echoed in an ethics of responsibility as argued 
for by Van Niekerk (2002: 35-43) and De Roubaix (2005: 155-62), 
based on the work of Lyotard, Bauman and Hans Jonas, and which, 
argues Bauman, “is the only foundation morality can have” (Bauman 
1993: 75, also 77).
2.3 Postmodern ethics is fundamentally relativistic and 
“anything goes”8
These serious and fundamental charges strike at the heart of post-
modernism (Bauman 1993: 42, 14). Van Niekerk (1992: 165) reflects 
on the question of relativism in postmodernity, and quotes Harvey 
Siegel to describe “the impotence of relativism”:
‘n Relativis is nie in staat om beduidende, kritiese oordele oor die 
geldigheid of houdbaarheid van aansprake te vel nie. Hy is ook nie 
in staat om reg te laat geskied aan konsepsies van geregverdigheid 
of legitimiteit met betrekking tot oortuigings en kennisaansprake 
nie [...] Maar in die derde [...] plek, moet ons ook sê dat ‘n relativis 
kwalik in staat is om leiding te gee of rigting aan te dui ten opsigte 
van hoe ons in die wêreld behoort op te tree. ‘n Relativis beskik oor 
geen oortuigende gronde om reg van verkeerd en goed van kwaad 
te onderskei nie.9
Van Niekerk (1992: 168) proceeds to align postmodernism and rela-
tivism:
Die verband tussen postmodernisme en konserwatisme is duidelik: 
eersgenoemde is niks minder nie as ‘n flirtasie met relativisme, en 
daarom ‘n rooftog op die vermoë om krities te staan teenoor poli-
tieke en sosiale ongeregtigheid.10
8 This issue is discussed in detail in Cilliers 2005.
9 A relativist is not able to render significant or sustainable critical judgment 
regarding the validity of claims. Nor can he judge conceptions of justifiability 
or legitimacy with regard to convictions and truth claims. A relativist is hardly 
able to provide leadership or direction to indicate how we should act in life. He 
has no convincing grounds to discern right from wrong, good from bad.
10 The relationship between postmodernism and relativism is clear; the former is 
nothing less than a flirtation with relativism, and therefore a plundering of the 
ability to criticize political and social injustice.
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The charge of relativism is consequent to the absence of over-
riding meta-control or universalism. There is no apparent frame-
work to adjudicate morality, no clear normative theory of morality; 
in the absence of these controls, morality is necessarily relativistic. 
If all contemporary ethical narratives have but local range, without 
overarching controlling meta-narratives or integral control systems, 
social structure fragments into piecemeal individuality resulting in 
small, closed and isolated systems. This leads to relativism and the 
notion of “anything goes” (goes the charge). This misconception of 
postmodernity denies the contribution made by complexity theory. 
We substantiate our position against this kind of relativism in terms 
of two arguments.
Firstly, Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984: 15) argues that the inter-
wovenness of social relations “creates” a network within which the 
individual is subjugated to the relationship which emphasises a mul-
tiplicity, but not necessarily a fragmentation. Discourse within con-
textual interest-clusters implies a process of constant interaction within 
which local narratives only make sense against the surrounding back-
ground which “legitimates” it. Each node in the system forms part 
of many patterns; the self partakes of many discourses. Within the 
complex interactivity we find, define and redefine ourselves but not as 
independent individuals. There is “structure” in this ethical pro cess 
— structure not subject to complete description (definitely not meta-
description) — but structure that repeatedly rediscovers, re for mulates 
and restructures itself. This structure is however not uni versal, eternal, 
fixed and rule-bound. “Control” is not external. Never theless, there 
are identifiable patterns in the system which we can say something 
about. Relativism and the notion of “anything goes” therefore does 
not describe this framework.11
11 If this does not convince critics, an even stronger defence is to be found in the 
following position: is the process of ethics not inevitably relativistic? Secondly, 
as exposed above, modernity has much to answer for in terms of relativism, and 
should be content with defending itself. Thirdly, even if a measure of relativism is 
to be found in postmodernity, at least it is balanced with the underlying truth 
that here we have ethics which are also moral, a defence lacking in modernity.
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Secondly, the striking irony is that relativism has always been 
integrally present in modernity, but has been partly ignored, in part 
negated as a temporary irritant whilst denying its structural inte-
gration with modernity (Bauman 1993: 42). Practical problematics 
do not allow modernity to be charged with any form of insecurity 
and any relativism is (argue modernists) simply a temporary and 
current speed hump. The eventual aim of modernity is universalism 
through universalisation, a futuristic pipe dream which Diderot calls 
poste romania. Pettit (2000: 175) confirms the connection between 
universalisability and relativism by claiming that “[i]f non-conse-
quentialists are to embrace the requirement of universalizability, 
then they will have to adopt a surprisingly relativistic stance”.
2.4 Operationalism undermines the postmodern 
position
Van Peursen (1974: 12) describes three overlapping phases of human 
cultural development: the mythical, ontological and contemporary 
functional. Chronologically the onset of the ontological predates mo-
dernity but shares the characteristics of universal rule-bound morality 
which fixates in substantialism. To escape the latter, society becomes 
functional, but this in turn fixates into operationalism. Elements of 
the phases may be concurrent — for instance religion as mythical, 
law as ontological and love and human relationships as functional 
expression. Van Peursen’s description of ethics in the functional 
phase equates with deeply practical and existential life experience. 
Morality is understood as being something to be discovered and 
rediscovered. Justice is viewed as being a concrete contextual action. 
The threat is that the functional fixates in operationalism, that eve-
rything is defined in terms of function alone.
Can a similar charge be laid against postmodern ethics, itself a 
description of a function of society? The following four reasons sug-
gest why operationalism should not be a risk. Firstly, the postmod-
ern ethical position denies universalism or a single narrative descrip-
tion in terms of functionality. Secondly, the exposure of the moral 
agent in the agonistics of society is more than an abstract functional 
exchange of information; s/he exposes herself/himself. The agent is 
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personally involved in the ethical process, a process which is not fic-
tional or abstract but real and actual. Thirdly, the complex interac-
tive dynamics of the process implies that moral agency is also estab-
lished in the application of the results or products of the process. And 
fourthly, the functionalism described by Van Peursen results from 
the recognition of the inability of humankind to define, describe and 
indeed know fundamental truths (about God for instance). This is 
not the purpose of the ethical function of society.
2.5 Postmodern ethical ideas are not applicable to 
bioethics
Arguing from a modernist position, it is suggested that practical de-
cisions require rules. Without rules one cannot make progress when 
dealing with the messiness of the world. The postmodern position 
argues, on the contrary, that we will not be ethical if we do not take 
this “messiness” into account. Even the bioethical sphere does not escape 
this “messiness” when one considers the number of contextually- 
interested role-players such as decision makers, clinicians, thera-
pists, nurses, close family and friends, and patients (grouped around 
“themes” like abortion, euthanasia, stem cell research for instance). 
Morality is the result of a constant, reflexively-modulated inter active 
agonistic of the contextual grouping, with reference to ap plic able texts 
and the “footprint” of past discourse. It would never theless be counter-
intuitive to imply that these moral decisions cannot be subject to critical 
meta-ethical evaluation by, for instance, academics and com mittees.
This reflection on the nature of postmodern ethics makes the 
most important difference between modern and postmodern ethics 
explicit: the role played by and the status of rules.
3. Are existing rules and laws inapplicable?
Postmodernists argue for the inappropriateness of “single-narrative” 
universal moral rules characteristic of modernity. Universality actu-
ally negates the moral prerogative (Bauman 1993: 40-1); as moral 
agents, we cannot sidestep our responsibility to make choices. The 
rules of modernity limit us as ethical beings; postmodernity liberates 
94
Acta Academica 2008: 40(2)
us to choices without the apparent security of rules. Furthermore, 
using rules as a shield makes morality superfluous, resulting in “a 
world in which the language and appearance of morality persist even 
though the integral substance of morality has to a large degree been 
fragmented and then, in part destroyed” (MacIntyre 1981: 5). Simply 
following ethical rules results in a state of equilibrium which leads 
to moral stagnation since it creates the illusion that the ethical di-
lemma or question has been settled once and for all. This is a denial 
of the complexity of the problem.
Rules of one sort or another are of course unavoidable in the 
reality of life. Are existing rules and laws that impact on moral be-
haviour then not legitimate? They may be, conditional on a full know-
ledge of their limitations, provisionality and susceptibility to revi-
sion. Secondly, in their application they should be applied ethically, 
ie responsibly, recognising their tentative nature. They are not the 
formal, universalisable modernistic rules of, for example, Immanuel 
Kant. Blindly applied rules cannot guarantee ethical certainty. From a 
postmodern perspective, certainty is contextual, tentative, and open 
to revision. Thirdly, context determines their applicability. As in any 
hermeneutic dynamic, ethical decisions constantly reflect back to 
modify and change societal positions. Problems are not solved once 
decisions have been reached. Ethical knowledge is as contextual and 
contingent as all knowledge. 
A continued debate, revisitation and evolution from historically 
fixed positions should characterise contemporary ethics. Conflicting 
narratives surrounding contextual moral societies will foster a vi-
brant ethical system. The abortion and euthanasia debates in South 
Africa illustrate these points; note how positions have evolved and 
softened. If moral rules do not comply with these qualifications, one 
is justified to question them.
How does the notion of a modernistic bioethics stand up to the 
demands based on the analysis as set out above? We will restrict our-
selves to an evaluation of principlism because of its dominant posi-
tion in contemporary bioethics. In order to do this, a description of 
what principlism is, will follow in order to explain why it is typical 
of modernistic ethics.
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4. Principlism: the paradigm model of biomedical 
ethics
Radical medical advances in recent decades, radical societal changes, 
and the consequent insecurity of postmodern persons have exposed a 
need for ethical rules at a time when the application of those rules, ie 
modernity, is increasingly questioned. Zygmunt Bauman (1993: 31) 
describes this as the “ethical dilemma of postmodernity”. The vacuum 
in medico-ethical thought was filled by lawyers and philosophers.
Two facets of contemporary American culture in which the “par-
adigm model” surfaced, explain the characteristics and genesis of the 
model: the culture of “rights” and the role of litigation in American 
society. The rights of patients (and consequent obligations of practi-
tioners) became the focus of a dedicated group of lawyers whose aim 
was financial compensation through claims of negligent fulfilment of 
these rights. Ethical disputes were settled in American courts, prompt-
ing Annas (1993: 3) to declare: “American law, not philosophy or medi-
cine, is primarily responsible for the agenda, development, and current 
state of American bioethics”.12 American jurisprudence thus became the 
moral arbiter and the foundations of principlism were laid.
Capron (1995: 1329-35) supports this analysis of the genesis 
of principlism. In line with the American practice, ethical dilem-
mas were decided in a court of law. Yet predominantly fact-based 
inductive reasoning based on, or justified by, case law contrasts and 
compliments principlism. Pluralistic societies do not always have 
the ability to reach consensus, sometimes necessitating an accepted 
procedure to settle disputes. Emphasis on protection of the individual 
finds application in the protection of patient rights (particularly in 
research). Specific values such as justice (versus progress), equality 
(versus degrees of equality), due process (versus scientific proof) and 
self-determination (versus “beneficent” paternalism and common good) 
quite clearly have influenced bioethics.
12 Oliver Wendell Holmes’s (1920: 172) comment on the difference between mo-
rality and the law (constitution) is apt: “[...] nothing but confusion of thought 
can result from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally 
rights in the sense of the Constitution and the law”.
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According to Winkler & Coombs (1993: 343) it is the philosopher 
who has taken over the role of moral arbiter; “applied ethics” is more or 
less an extension of general ethical theory. However, the philosopher 
lacks practical knowledge and experience of medical practice, without 
which some ethical dilemmas cannot be sufficiently addressed. Based 
on her/his understanding of matters, the result of her/his critical and 
constructive reflection amount to abstract ethical rules. Respect for 
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice are the four prin-
ciples which crystallize in the “Paradigm model of biomedical ethics” 
(Winkler & Coombs 1993: 343-65). This version of principlism as 
advocated and propagated by Beauchamp & Childress (1994) is the 
cornerstone of biomedical ethical thinking and teaching.
Winkler & Coombs (1993) base their criticism on the conflict-
ing origins and references of the principles. Each emanates from a dif-
ferent tradition and normative theory: autonomy from the Kantian, 
beneficence from classical utility and justice from contractarianism, 
problematising cohesion. Secondly, there is tension in the “right” of 
philosophers to moral verdict in a very complex applied field. Some 
clinicians regard the paradigm model as too theoretical and intellec-
tual, and hold that only they can form a true picture of the pro blems of 
contemporary medicine. Thirdly, Winkler & Coombs deny the top-to-
bottom applicability of principles (deny applied ethics as such). They 
limit the legitimate role of philosophy as one of facilitation. Abstract 
biomedical reflection should be based upon accepted medical wisdom, 
whereas it is quite common for bioethical publications to dwell almost 
exclusively on the abstract with disregard to context.13
13 Having given air to Winkler’s criticisms, it seems only fair to see what he sug-
gests as an alternative; Winkler (1993: 360) advocates contextualism: “[...] 
that moral problems must be resolved within concrete circumstances, in all 
their interpretive complexity, by appeal to relevant historical and cultural tra-
ditions, with reference to critical institutional and professional norms and vir tues, 
and by utilizing the primary method of comparative case analysis. Applicable 
moral principles will derive mainly from these sources, rather than from ethical 
theory on the grand scale.” Winkler thus describes a bottom-up application in 
support of the current reanimation of casuistry.
 McKinney (2000: 466-479) entertains a view of casuistry in current garb as 
“belonging to the paradoxical camp of postmodernism” by stating “What is 
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Our response to Winkler & Coombs is ambivalent. On the one 
hand, it seems self-evident that only experienced practitioners of me-
dicine may be empowered to address some ethical dilemmas. Fur-
thermore, morality is enmeshed in one’s daily life, and is fundamental 
also to responsible medical practice. Yet, not all aspects of bioethics 
are based predominantly on clinical exposure. Clinical experience 
alone does not provide answers to all bioethical dilemmas; for ex-
ample, it does not contribute much to the full and satisfactory ex-
ploration of issues such as abortion, the nature and beginning of life, 
genetic manipulation, cloning, stem cell research and euthanasia. 
Moreover, clinicians often lack the tools for moral discourse (we are 
nevertheless impressed with the ability of medical students to deve-
lop this skill even in a relatively short period of intensive interactive 
training). It would be counter-intuitive not to concede and respect 
the medical insights that some philosophers have deve loped, and their 
contribution to bioethics. Not all biomedical know ledge/informa-
tion is that difficult to assimilate, even by non-medical graduates. 
Biomedical scholars can claim no a priori exclusive right to bioethical 
debate. Winkler and Coombs’ criticism is therefore of limited ap-
plication; there are roles both for clinician and philosopher which go 
beyond the application of principlism. These roles should ideally be 
integrated, not separated.
5. Principlism as a prime example of modernist 
morality
Beauchamp & Childress (1994: 37) have their own narrative about 
the genesis of principlism, with the philosopher’s role chronologically 
of later and secondary nature. Their abstract and general principles 
develop from “general morality” (“common sense morality” [Van 
den Hoven 2006: 46-8]) and “accepted medical practice”, which are 
rendered coherent through conceptual clarification and other methods 
(Beauchamp & Childress 1994: 3, 37, 106-9). Principles are analysed in 
most attractive about casuistry today is thus its quest to balance the need for 
principles with the necessity to attend to the particular circumstances of a situa-
tion, exactly what Aristotle called for centuries ago”.
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terms of (American) case law and are prima facie binding, yet subject 
to revision and justifiable moral judgment based on the principles. 
Together with other aspects of the moral life (moral emotions, virtue 
and rights), this is presented as their moral theory (the authors do not 
use the term theory). Our supposition is that it is a modernist theory.
Immanuel Kant is an archetype of modernist ethics (Norman 
1998: 70-91). Kantian morality is established in the good intentions 
of agents and is viewed as being formal, general and universalizable. 
A categorical imperative to act in accordance with these moral rules 
rests upon moral agents and the underlying motivation is reason, not 
emotion, context, or consequence. Morality implies being taught a 
collection of “precise, hard and fast, unexceptional rules not open to 
multiple interpretation” (Bauman 1993: 1, 18), rules that would other-
wise never be discovered in an environment conducive to conformity 
(Bauman 1993: 26-7). The only choice is to apply the applicable rule 
once identified (though that is not the final word on principlism).14 
The aim of principlism is coherence of our incoherent, conflicting, 
complex “common moral opinions”. Mariëtte van den Hoven ques-
tions the possibility of such “coherence”, and the likelihood that this 
account would “be more accurate in daily practice or will lead to bet-
ter judgements about right and wrong” — the stated aim of princi-
plism (Van den Hoven 2006: 48). Postmodernists would agree with 
this criticism; coherence is neither possible nor required.
We have reason thus to equate principlism with modernist ethics. 
Both rely on formal, overriding universalizable, meta-functioning 
rules and laws. In fact, we suggest the following objective definition 
of principlism: a theory of applied biomedical ethics in which pre-
determined normative and universalizable moral principles serve as 
guidelines to ethical behaviour. For these authors rules and principles 
are central and compulsory to bioethics because of the emphasis on 
action guidelines.
14 True to the postmodern position with its notions of conflict, multiplicity of 
stories and insecurity, Pippin (2001: 386-7) reminds us that there are other views 
on Kant, for instance a well-reasoned interpretation that Kant correctly read, 
represents an underlying value-ethic.
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Furthermore principlism is impartialist due to the fact that it 
suggests an ethics based on impartiality, impersonality, universal 
principle and formal rationality (cf Allmark 1995). These characte-
ristics of modernism are precisely the targets of postmodern criticism. 
Ethical debate ceases upon the introduction of principles (Bauman 
1993: 29, 75, 78, Winkler& Coomb 1993: 355).15
6. An ethics of responsibility
If the postmodern view of morality is authentic and our criticism 
legitimate, we require a comprehensive rethink of the meaning of 
applied bioethics. Descriptives other than “moral” may perhaps be 
valid. One might even consider the possibility that the word “ethi-
cal” has different meanings. We do not deny that the principles of 
Beauchamp & Childress may exemplify good, but not necessarily 
morally good medical practice. Though postmodernity might not 
rescue American bioethics, other scripts might still be rewritten, or 
15 Ironically, our criticism of principlism is supported by its authors: “Often what 
counts most in the moral life is not consistent adherence to principles and rules, 
but reliable character, moral good sense, and emotional responsiveness [...] feel-
ings and concerns for others lead us to actions that cannot be reduced to the 
following of principles and rule […] morality would be a cold and uninspiring 
practice without various traits of character, emotional responses, and ideals 
that reach beyond principles and rules” (Beauchamp & Childress 1994: 462). 
Therefore rights, virtue and emotions are not excluded; contextually they may 
be of greater importance than principles. It is only through this admission that 
principlism can become a framework for moral decision making. The cynic may 
be excused if s/he questions the validity of principles if in the end values and 
character are of overriding importance. The answer should be forthcoming: the 
chapter in which the importance of values and character is motivated, appears 
for the first time in the 4th edition of Beauchamp & Childress’ book Principles 
of Biomedical Ethics, and, in all probability, is an addition, following criticism 
such as Winkler’s and (the authors indeed admit), “recent ethical theory’s” 
emphasis on “neglected moral phenomena, including character and virtue” 
(Beauchamp & Childress 1994: 62). One can reason that the theory attains le-
gitimacy through the possibility of evolutionary development, even though the 
central theme remains the principles, which therefore maintain overarching meta-
status but are rendered ethical through the addition of virtue and character.
100
Acta Academica 2008: 40(2)
re-choreographed.16 The fundamental challenge is to render bioethics 
truly moral. The important message of postmodernity for bioethics is 
to point to an ethics of responsibility, an approach that goes beyond 
the strict divisions of deontology and utilitarianism, whose polarised 
moral approaches have inherent difficulties that make their exclusive 
application problematic. Deontology does not recognise the complex-
ity of real moral dilemmas. Hiding behind rigid rules can subjugate 
the requirement for responsible moral action. A problem that both of 
these approaches share is impartialism (Allmark 1995: 19).
An ethics of responsibility ruthlessly underwrites “situationally 
based responses” (Allmark 1995: 20),17 and demands justification 
16 Herwitz (1999) reminds us that we (implying South Africa) are only now in the 
process of being exposed to postmodernism in its trek from the north, that we 
can hardly entertain talk of “deconstruction” since we have not “constructed” 
(properly) yet, and cannot prognosticate on postmodernism and its effect on 
South African society at this early stage; yet he adds the very realistic comment 
that whatever we tend to make of our new society, we shall not be able to escape 
the consequences of postmodernist thinking.
17 Bauman’s view on morality derives and develops many of his central ideas 
from the work of the Lithuanian born French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas, 
especially as far as the “awakening to moral responsibility” is concerned. The 
intimacy of this initial awakening has to be extended to the moral plurality 
of society, through “comprehensive thematization and systematic objectification, 
(though this holds the danger of) reducing all otherness (yet it has a) subordi-
nate truth […] with regard to the economic and political conditions of univer-
sal justice towards all individuals whom I cannot encounter personally. With 
and through the other I meet all humans. Herein lies the origin of equality and 
human rights”. (Audi 1999: 498). Bauman’s position on the nature of moral res-
ponsibility can be summed in the following excerpt (Bauman 1993: 73-74):
 “The other is a face in as far as I lead the way, spearhead her command, an-
ticipate it and provoke; as I command her to command me. The Other is an 
authority since I am willing to listen to the command before the command has 
been spoken, and to follow the command before I know what it commands me 
to do.” “… the other is weak, and it is precisely that weakness that makes my 
positioning her as the Face a moral act: I am fully and truly for the other, since 
it is I who give her the right to command, make the weak strong, make the 
silence speak, make the non-being into being through offering it the right to 
command me. ‘I am for the other’ means I give myself to the other as hostage. I 
take responsibility for the Other. But I take that responsibility not in the way 
one signs a contract and takes upon himself the obligations that the contract 
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and responsibility for our moral actions. It recognises the import of 
contextual social, political and cultural factors in moral deliberation. 
We are guided in our quest for moral responsibility by responsive-
ness to reasons, but not determined by it (Watson 2001: 375). This 
ethic implies taking a broad, inclusive view.
Recognition of an unqualified and almost limitless responsi bi 
 lity towards the “other” constitutes the moral agent (Bauman 1993: 
52); no reward or reciprocity is expected. The relationship is, there-
fore, not contractual. Contractuality neutralises any thoughts of real 
morality (Bauman 1993: 58).18 “Responsibility” is “unbearable silent” 
(Bauman 1993: 78-9). This translates into an understanding which 
claims that accepting responsibility implies forsaking the moral se-
curity of convention, rules and appearances. Moral responsibility is 
a fundamental, troubling, powerless and disarming authority; trou-
bling because it is vague in the sense of an absence of directing rules 
to guarantee correctness. It is fundamentally contextual (Bauman 1993: 
80). This moral uncertainty/anxiety leading to self-critical re flection 
— have I done enough; what is enough? — is the only foundation 
of morality. The yearning to moral action, not moral action as such, 
constitutes the moral self. Authenticity demands that morality does 
not remain totally theoretical (Bauman 1993: 81).
Hans Jonas (1984: 90) argues that any concept of responsibility 
implies the belief “that acting makes an impact on the world”, “that 
such acting is under the agent’s control”, and that the consequences 
of action are to some extent foreseeable. His notion implies two pro-
positions: “accountability ‘for’ one’s deeds” and “‘for’ particular ob-
jects”. Formal responsibility implies a direct, causal responsibility and 
legal liability; a precondition “but not yet itself morality” (Jonas 1984: 
stipulates. It is I who take the responsibility, and I may take that responsibility 
[…] as if it was mine without ever being taken by me. My responsibility, which 
constitutes, simultaneously, the Other as the Face and me as the moral self, is 
unconditional.”
18 To illustrate the awesome implications of this notion of ultimate responsibility, 
Bauman (1993: 80) recounts the history of Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, who 
rescued many Polish Nazi victims, and said of his attempts: “Only those who 
died bringing help can say that they have done enough.”
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92). Accepting responsibility is not necessarily a moral deed; it is not 
enough. To this needs to be added a substantive responsibility (Jonas 
1984: 92-3), implying responsibility not only for past conduct and 
its consequences, but also “for the matter that has a claim on my act-
ing”. My responsibility does not merely cause me to screen actions for 
moral acceptability, but pro-actively reflects on actions not otherwise 
contemplated. I am obliged to act since I have the power to do so. The 
dependence of the moral other commands my action. Moral responsi-
bility implies the conjoining of need and power to act.
To act responsibly may mean to disregard rules, conventions 
and appearance, to look the “Moral Other” in the eye; to make my-
self aware of and accountable for her needs without any hint of con-
tractual reciprocity. Jonas (1984: 94) argues that “only one who has 
responsibility can act irresponsibly”. When circumstances place the 
fate of others in my care, my control over their fate implies a distinct 
moral obligation. If I disregard this, I act irresponsibly. Jonas argues 
that this responsibility can never apply with moral equals, since it is 
by nature non-contractual. “Horizontal” responsibilities tend to be 
contractual; “vertical” responsibilities are more inclined to be moral. 
This responsibility is “as unconditional and irrevocable as any posit-
ed by nature” (Jonas 1984: 95), for example parental responsibilities. 
“Other human subjects” are therefore the primary objects of responsi-
bility (Jonas 1984: 98). For Jonas, “responsibility is first and foremost 
of men to men”. Since it is only man who can have responsibility, it 
means also that s/he “must have it for others of his like”; it is “con-
cretely given with the very existence of man” (Jonas 1984: 99). Re-
sponsibility spans both time and space. The parallels between this notion 
of responsibility and responsible medical practice are self-evident.
A conception of an ethic of responsibility can be distilled into 
the following viewpoint (based on Van Niekerk 2002: 35-43): this 
ethic makes all people accept responsibility for the creations of science 
and technology. It denies that “morality is exclusively determined by 
rules, codes and laws behind which people can comfortably hide when 
justifying the morality of actions in morally complex si tuations”. 
The “only sustainably-defensible basis for morality” is that I am ac-
countable to the unconditional claim that others make on me to have 
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their interests at heart, irrespective of their reciprocity. An ethics of 
responsibility grapples with the “quagmire of new, unprecedented 
challenges springing from technological innovation”. This is not a 
recipe for infallible moral decisions but an attempt to guide us be-
tween the extremes of total trust in science and medicine, and of 
the presumption of moral infallibility. An ethics of responsibility 
“recognizes the fallibility of human insight”. The moral debate is 
no longer restricted to the realm of “ethics specialists”. This means 
empowerment of all involved in patient care and decision-making, 
extending to the general public since they are the final decision makers 
(and patients).
But why should the combination of complexity theory, the ethics 
of postmodernity, and (in particular) an ethic of responsibility, have 
some allure for the bioethicist? The reason is quite evident: it is be-
cause there is a “natural”, hand-in-glove affinity between these three 
entities. Postmodern society is complex; the human body is complex; 
the practice of medicine is complex; and therefore it stands to reason 
that the ethics of biomedicine, if it aims to be relevant and contextual, 
should acknowledge this complexity.
The human body and its subsystems can be described as systems 
of complexity in the following way, using the example of the central 
nervous system with its innumerable inter-neuronal connections: 
Each neuron (and/or groups of neurons) can be seen as an element, 
the basic building block of the complex system. Each has numerous, 
potentially innumerable connections (synapses), with numerous/in-
numerable other neurons. The action of each neuron is, on the face 
of it, simple (as is the “action” — the transfer of a limited amount of 
information — between elements in any complex system). It either 
releases a certain amount (more or less, depending on circumstances) 
of the neurotransmitter stored in its intracellular vesicles (eg adrena-
line, nor-adrenaline, serotonin), thereby stimulating or inhibiting its 
neighbour, or it does not, and does not stimulate or inhibit the latter. Yet 
the complexity of its connections and pattern of stimulation, within 
the sum-total of the actions of the millions of other neurons/groups of 
neurons that make up the cell mass of the brain, make the actions of the 
system typical of great complexity. These actions are non-linear, well-
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nigh unpredictable, and open-ended (may be influenced by other sen-
sory and knowledge/information input, activity in other systems and 
organs, emotions, and so forth). No single neuron/group has “control” 
over the actions of those it influences, or the system as a whole, and 
neither is it in turn controlled by any single neuron/group, nor is there 
any over-riding or meta-control. Nevertheless, powerful impulse-
clusters — such as strong emotions or significant sensory input — can 
permeate and influence the whole system (one of the most powerful 
extraneous influence is the electric shock of electro-convulsive therapy, 
which, after years of disfavour, has found new favour among clini-
cians). The total number nodes or points of contact (synapses) where 
energy is transferred and the number of interactions is thus vast, and 
complex context-sensitive patterns encode information, create mean-
ing and make sense of all of this. True to complexity, “meaning” in this 
sense is contextual, temporary and subject to constant revision based 
on continuous fresh information.
Other functions of the human body can also be described in 
terms of complexity theory. Consider the complex way in which the 
heart or lungs respond to a myriad of interrelated impulses, some 
humorally transferred, others via the nervous system. The pulse rate, 
stroke volume and cardiac output, for example, vary constantly, sub-
ject to a variety of inputs. It therefore stands to reason that therapeu-
tic interventions slide into and form part of this complex system (or 
should one use the plural?). It is true that therapy usually has rather 
limited and particular aims — eg killing off certain pathogenic bugs 
that happen to have made a particular body their temporary home, 
or to improve cardiac output or decrease heart rate. But it is immedi-
ately equally true that most of our goal-directed treatment modali-
ties have effects — which doctors have learnt to call “side effects” 
— which often are as significant as the primary objectives and effects 
of medication. Few physicians realise, actively contemplate, or, very 
frequently, understand this. Not all of these effects are necessarily 
detrimental, or seriously so; the point is, however, that if one fiddles 
with the unsteady “state” of a complex system (complex in respect 
both of the ordinary meaning of the word, ie complicated, but also 
in the rather specialised meaning allied to complexity theory; the 
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reader will also remember that we stated earlier that there is no equi-
librium in a complex system), the results are bound to be as complex 
as the system itself. Particular areas of highly specialised medicine 
are especially complex in both senses; for example, anaesthesiology 
and intensive care medicine often utilise a variety of agents to ma-
nipulate function (the end-point, unfortunately, in intensive care 
medicine, is often the normalisation of “numbers” without a clear 
predictable improvement of final outcome).
It thus stands to reason that the ethics that we should “employ” to 
describe, evaluate, judge and perhaps influence these complex actions 
and activities, would of necessity have to be equally complex. And this 
is our quest: to apply the ideas that emanate from the preceding to the 
practice of medicine and its ethics. We suggest that an ethic of respon-
sibility is most suited to our project. There are a number of “principles” 
that, true to the spirit of complexity, seem to present themselves as coat-
hangers for practical use. The key words are contextuality, inclusivity, 
comprehensiveness, open-endedness and revision.
Formal, Kantian or utilitarian theories may have limited ap-
plication in bioethics (eg utilitarian principles in budget allocation, 
and some form of consequentialism in outcome-based medicine), 
but for real day-to-day moral dilemmas we require a situation-based 
approach. This means that we have no choice but to take context into 
consideration. We need to “discover” what is right for this patient 
in these particular conditions and circumstances. This underlines the 
uniqueness of each person and his or her situation. Of course this 
implies that we have a contextual knowledge and understanding of 
the circumstances of each individual (no ivory-towerism!). In order 
to obtain this information we need to consult widely, inclusively, 
indeed comprehensively. There is no “quick-fix”; we need to listen 
with a nuanced ear to the many and varied inputs we are bound to 
(obliged to) receive. The ideal — though we grant that this may not 
always be possible — would be a decision that, as it were, “emerges” 
from this ethical melee.
But is there still a role for the so-called “ethical specialist” and 
other knowledgeable persons (those against whom Winkler & Coombs 
rebel), given this irreducible contextualisation? We wish to argue 
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that their role is extremely important, even essential. The type of input 
they can provide will permeate through the whole complex system 
of positions involved and influence it in important ways (think of, 
for example, the legal implications of certain decisions and/or omis-
sions which require expert opinion). Their role could also include the 
facilitation of discussion, keeping it, as it were, on the right track, or 
re-initiate it when it grinds to a halt, without falling into rule-bound 
or rule-quoting decision-making processes. And once decisions are 
made, they can remind those involved that these decisions are never-
theless contextual, tentative, subject to revision and not hard-and-
fast universalizable rules. They will have to be reconsidered as time 
goes by and when other apparently similar cases arise.
This ethic has a very important ultimate “purpose” or “function”. 
Jonas (1984: 99) argues that the “dignity of man can only be spoken 
of as potential”. Man, therefore, first has to exist, and continue to 
exist to keep open this “ever-transcendent possibility”. Morality is 
a “transcendence” of being; “more precisely, of the chance of such 
transcendence” (Bauman 1993: 72). The “first commandment” is 
therefore that men live on earth; “that they live well is the second 
commandment” (Jonas 1984: 99). Humankind has a “kind of meta-
physical responsibility beyond self-interest” (Jonas 1984: 136); this 
commandment underlines bioethical responsibility.19, 20
7. Conclusion
We have attempted to show how arguments from a postmodern per-
spective resist general solutions to ethical problems, with specific 
reference to bioethical issues. The charge that postmodern ethics 
leads to a free-for-all relativism has been rejected by showing that 
19 “Nature could not have incurred a greater hazard than to produce man” (Jonas 
1984: 138)
20 Jonas says that not only should humankind survive for her/his own sake, but 
what s/he has done to “nature” implies an additional imperative to continued 
survival; only humankind can clear up the mess s/he has made through ecolo-
gical intervention and the often unintended consequences of scientific and 
technological developments!
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complex problems cannot be addressed in a generalised or universal 
way. The acknowledgement that what we deal with is complex in-
troduces an irreducible contingency into the consideration of every 
ethical dilemma. This acknowledgement compels us not to rely on 
universal ethical principles which are generated without taking the 
contingent factors involved in each case into consideration. Every-
one involved in the making of a decision has to assume the responsi-
bility for that decision despite the fact that we know beforehand that 
a perfect decision cannot be made.
Despite the practical nature of bioethical dilemmas, and despite 
the fact that real action must follow the decision, this responsibility 
cannot be shifted onto legal or moral rules, or onto institutions. We 
have to get involved in the nitty-gritty of each particular issue. The 
acceptance of the responsibility for the actual decisions we make is 
certainly less comfortable than merely applying a generalised solu-
tion. The resulting provisionality of our decisions means that we can 
never escape the dilemma of trying to make a just decision whilst 
realising that we cannot be fully just, and this leads to a certain ten-
sion. Nevertheless, we cannot escape this tension without losing our 
humanity. 
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